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Abstract 
This paper is based on a study of defects and defect costs in seven building 
projects in Sweden. Special observers collected information on 3000 defects 
found on site. The causes were primarily ascribed to the individuals’ actions, 
knowledge, information and motivation. Lack of motivation was found to be the 
most common cause.  
Almost 100 interviews were made with key persons in the projects to find the 
underlying causes of defects. The causes were mainly found in how the project 
organisation was structured. Unstable organisations were found to create 
uncertainty. Four types of organisational instability were identified; gaps in 
vertical relationships, gaps in horizontal relationships, organisation not created in 
time, and changes in the organisation. 
The current market situation caused large time and cost pressure. It influenced 
how the organisation was structured and how the individuals were acting.  
Individual causes, as well as organisational causes, are discussed. 
Key words: Defects, causes of defects, human error, motivation, organisational 
instability 
1  Introduction 
Besides external demands, the principal driving force behind improvement is 
knowledge of the improvement possibilities. Knowledge of where defects occur is 
necessary in order to focus upon where improvement measures are most effective. 
The study concerns defects found on construction sites during production. Their 
causes can however be referred to other project phases. The main aim is to find 
possibilities to improve the construction process. The practical aim is to elucidate 
the size of defect costs and the causes of the defects. The theoretical aim is to 
increase the knowledge of why defects actually occur.   
The study is performed in cooperation between the Department of Building 
Economics and Construction Management at Chalmers University of Technology 
and “R&D West”, a regional working group of construction companies in 
Sweden. The study is a continuation and deepening of a study carried out in 1986-
90 by the same R&D group (see Augustsson et al., 1989, Hammarlund et al., 
1990, Josephson, 1990, and Josephson, 1994). In this paper the causes of defects 
are discussed. 
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2  A model 
According to Gryna (1988), cause is defined as a proven reason for the existence 
of a defect. Often there are several causes of the same erroneous action. There 
may be either combined causes, or a chain of causes. For this reason, the term 
“root cause” is used to describe the most basic cause of an undesirable condition. 
If the root cause is eliminated or corrected, this will prevent the recurrence of the 
defect (Dew, 1991, Wilson et al., 1993). 
Organisations consist of individuals who cooperate with a specific aim. Therefore, 
it is natural for the defects to be ascribed to individuals (Matousek, 1985, 
Hammarlund et al., 1990, Nowak, 1992, CIB, 1993). It is generally believed that 
lack of knowledge, lack of information and lack of motivation cause defects. 
Carelessness is stated to be the most common cause (Bonshor and Harrison, 1982, 
Matousek, 1985, NEDO, 1987, Hammarlund et al., 1990). Lack of knowledge is 
often mentioned as the second most common cause of defects, but information is 
also often mentioned. This type of causes is called direct causes because this is the 
first type you encounter when analysing a specific defect. 
However, every action by an individual is influenced by organisational or 
environmental conditions. Therefore, the root causes can be found in 
organisational phenomena and in the organisation’s environment. This is called 
underlying causes (see Josephson, 1994, and Atkinson, 1998). 
The individual 
If individuals are to find it worthwhile to act at all, motivation, expectations and 
commitment are necessary (Brunsson, 1985). Motivation is people’s desire to 
contribute, through their own actions, to the resultant organisational action. 
Expectations imply that individuals believe that their actions will result in an 
organisational action. Commitment means that, in order to achieve something 
together, people must have some “control” over one another, i. e. they must be 
able to rely on certain types of behaviour and certain attitudes in the other team 
members. This control is secured by the creation of mutual commitment. 
Henceforth, “motivation” will here be used to describe the sum of these three 
conditions.  
Motivation alone is not enough. If an individual is to act correctly, on the basis of 
his own prerequisites, the individual must also have the necessary knowledge and 
the necessary information for the specific task. Knowledge is information about 
and understanding of a subject which a person has in his or her mind or which is 
shared by all human beings. Knowledge includes skill and experience. Skill is the 
knowledge and ability that enable a person to do something such as a job, game, 
or sport very well. Experience is knowledge or skill of a particular job that has 
been gained during a long period of working on the job. Information about the 
operation is received in communication between individuals or between 
organisations. 
Motivation, knowledge and information are mutually dependent (Josephson, 
1994). For instance, insufficient information involves lower motivation. 
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The concepts of risk and stress are central in the analysis of causes. Calculated 
risk means a conscious probability of defects. Higher calculated risk means that a 
higher probability of defects is accepted. Stress seems characteristic of temporary 
organisations. Stress is the general reaction of an organism, which is triggered 
when the individual is threatened (Söderberg, 1979). 
The organisation and its environment  
The individuals do not work alone. They work under the influence of (other 
individuals in) the own organisation or (individuals in) their environment. Leavitt 
(1978) describes organisations as multivariate systems, consisting of four groups 
of interacting variables.  
• Social structure concerns the organisations’ sub-system of communication, 
responsibility, authority, status, rewards and task-oriented procedures. 
• Goal includes the organisational goals and all work that has to be done to reach 
the goals. 
• Members concern the people in the organisation and the relation between them. 
A member can be an individual or a group of individuals. 
• Technology concerns the companies’ tools for problem solving, including the 
place of work and equipment as well as programs to organise and direct the 
work. 
However, organisations are not self-sufficient, they are dependent on the 
environment in which they act. They live in a specific physical, technological, 
cultural and social environment to which they must adapt themselves.  
Together, these five interacting groups of factors define the information and the 
expectations, goals, attitudes and assumptions, which the individuals use in their 
actions. It is no use analysing organisations without considering all these factors. 
The description shows the complex system of an organisation. The underlying 
causes of defects can be identified in the interaction between these factors. 
3  Method 
The study comprises an analysis of seven building projects, performed by 
different companies. Each of these had specific prerequisites, which in a crucial 
way influenced the process. They were chosen with the intention of acquiring 
knowledge about different types of projects; product type, contract form, size, 
time, geographical site etc. 
The methodology of the study has been discussed in Josephson (1998). The 
analysis of the direct causes is both qualitative and quantitative. It is based on 
mapping of defects that have occurred. Seven observers continuously followed the 
activities on one site each. They had no other task than to describe defects that 
occurred. For each defect they analysed and described its causes. The analysis of 
causes is made in cooperation between the observers and the people involved in 
the specific defect. 
The analysis of underlying causes is qualitative. It is mainly based on open 
interviews with 92 “key persons”, approximately 10-15 per project. They were: 8 
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client representatives, 11 architects, including interior architects, 5 structural 
engineers, 8 installation consultants, 9 project managers or assistant project 
managers, 7 site managers (with full responsibility for the site), 7 foremen, 12 
construction workers, mostly their representatives, 16 sub-contractors, managers 
as well as workers, and 1 materials manufacturer. Specific interviews were made 
with the observers. Each interview was made personally and lasted 30-90 minutes. 
They were tape-recorded and transcribed verbatim. 
4 Direct causes  
In most situations the individual who gave rise to a defect had the necessary 
knowledge and right information for the specific task, but he suffered from lack of 
motivation. Half of the total defect costs were classified as lack of motivation. 
More than ¼ of the defect costs were caused by lack of knowledge and 1/8 by lack 
of communication, while a small part was ascribed to stress and risk, Figure 1. 
The distinction between these groups is naturally very difficult, which means that 
the results should be used with caution.  
Defect cost (%)
Knowledge
29%
Information
12%
Motivation
50%
Stress
3%
Risk
6%
 
Figure 1: The direct causes (% of total defect cost).  
Motivation 
Motivation is here used to denote three mutually dependent concepts; motivation, 
expectance and commitment. The stronger the motivation, expectance and 
commitment, the more probable it is that the action is the right one.  
In the study it was not possible to judge whether the defect was caused by lack of 
motivation, expectance or commitment. However, it was possible to form an 
opinion of which level of motivation the individual had when he/she acted 
erroneously in the specific situation. The mistakes were considered to occur in 
either of three levels of motivation. 
• “Forgetfulness”. Defects made unintentionally and unconsciously, for instance 
forgetfulness and temporary inattention. 55% of the defects caused by lack of 
motivation belong to this group. 
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• “Carelessness”. Defects made unintentionally and unconsciously, but without 
necessary care. Carelessness and thoughtlessness amounted to 40% of the 
motivation defects. 
• “Conscious defect”. Defects made intentionally and consciously. Theft and 
damage by non-employed people belong to this group. 5% of the motivation 
defects belong to this group. 
The conception of motivation implies that defects are made intentionally. 
However, the study shows that just a few defects are intentional and that they are 
caused by non-employed people.  
Knowledge, information, risk and stress 
The knowledge defects were classified into three sub-groups; lack of knowledge, 
lack of skill and lack of experience. More than half of the defects were due to lack 
of knowledge, ¼ to lack of skill and 1/7 were caused by lack of experience. The 
distinction between these is difficult to make. 
12% of the defect cost could primarily be ascribed to lack of information. 
Information errors can explain many motivation errors. 
Stress and shortage of time characterise building projects. However, only 3% of 
the total defect cost could be ascribed to this cause. Shortage of time can be an 
underlying cause of motivation errors and information errors. 
Causes per actor 
Large amounts of defect costs could be ascribed to design, production 
management and workmanship. The direct causes varied for these groups of 
actors, Table 1. Among design defects, lack of knowledge was most common 
followed by lack of motivation. For defects in production management, lack of 
motivation was most common followed by lack of knowledge. For defects in 
workmanship, lack of motivation dominated. 
The results reflect each group’s work tasks. Design is knowledge-intensive and 
requires communication. Production managers have varied tasks. Their workload 
is often heavy and stressful. Workmanship sometimes involves similar tasks over 
a long period of time, which can explain why knowledge and information errors 
are rare. 
Table 1: Direct causes of defects in design, production management and workmanship. 
Cause Design Production management Workmanship 
Lack of knowledge 44 34 12 
Lack of information 18 11  6 
Lack of motivation  35 42 70 
Stress, shortage of time  2  5  1 
Risk  1  8 11 
Total  100 % 100 % 100 % 
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5  Underlying causes 
The most important issue is, however, what the underlying causes of defects are. 
What factors explain the direct causes presented above? Why does lack of 
motivation dominate? Irrespective of how you answer these questions, there are 
many mutually dependent factors, which together form a complex pattern of 
causes.  
5.1  Time and cost aspects   
The project time tends to be shorter and shorter within Swedish construction. In 
most of the studied projects the client stressed the importance of finishing the 
project in time. Reasons given were for example financial matters or that other 
activities would be starting such as a school term. 
At the time of the study there was a recession. Due to fierce competition both 
designers and contractors felt forced to accept the short contract times, which led 
to stress. 
“One consequence of the time pressure was that there were gaps in the 
brain work, that we didn’t think the project properly through.” 
(Architect)  
In several projects it was necessary to increase the team of workers in order to 
finish in time. As a consequence of this, the planning became difficult, and several 
categories of workers had to share the same areas. 
Due to hard competition, all projects were purchased at very low prices. For 
instance, several designers were payed as low as half of the ”normal” price for 
their jobs. All actors involved were put under hard pressure. This pressure was 
transferred along the chain of actors. 
The contractors had to force the price of materials and sub-contracts down. In 
several cases it gave negative results. 
“The cost pressure is total. We have left an offer, which is lower than the 
prime cost. The (specialised) purchasers experience this more. You have 
to set a ceiling, which they must not exceed. We work with our noses just 
above the water surface.…. It’s a success if you break even.”  
       (Assistant project manager)  
“Maybe you nag at the personnel on site a little too much: ‘Think over 
this!’ It means that you maybe press sub-contractors and suppliers a little 
too much sometimes, reducing the quality unconsciously.… .”  
      (Assistant project manager)  
The site managers became forced to scrutinise contract borders and machine use. 
There were clear signs of stinginess.  
“The main office is pushing us to be very careful to check everything we 
do.”      (Foreman)  
“Now we must be even more able to find out things which become 
cheaper and simply to be more stingy…..”  (Site manager) 
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This caused pressure on the construction workers. In some projects the site 
management economised on machines and other equipment. 
”We would very much like to have a lift. I have never been at a site with 
more than two storeys, which has not had a lift. We normally go up and 
down by lift with material ourselves, but here we run up and down the 
stairs like idiots”.     (Worker) 
“We very often hear how bad the project economy is, and they send back 
every little tiny machine as fast as possible because it costs money.”  
       (Worker) 
The situation became even more pressed by the client’s expressed demands on 
cost savings. The search for cheaper alternatives required considerable effort, for 
instance of the part of the designers.  
“I have designed a lobby completely finished. Everything was 
completely analysed according to standard, types of stones, types of 
surfaces etc. Then one day they called me and said that it will not be a 
stone floor, it will be a wooden floor instead. I was asked to redesign the 
stone floor to a wooden floor preserving some parts in limestone. After 
approximately ten days I had to redesign everything to limestone again. 
Because they had found a limestone which was cheaper than the wood.… 
so I have designed three different floors”.  (Architect)  
It is obvious that short project times and forced down prices have a considerable 
influence on the individual’s behaviour and therefore also on the process and the 
defect cost. 
5.2  Organisational aspects 
Most underlying causes can be ascribed to organisational conditions.  
Client’s lack of ability in decision-making 
Many actors experienced the lack of ability in the client organisation to make 
decisions. This led to much irritation on site. There was a clear wish for stricter 
control, better routines for decision-making and a clearer division of 
responsibility. 
“You have to control the brief and design process hard. You should be 
very resolute and demand answers at specific points in time, because you 
can’t keep on discussing forever. The (client’s) project manager must 
accept a discussion until a certain point in time and then the decision 
must be made.”     (Clients project manager) 
“You realise more and more that the routines of making decisions must 
be very clear. You can never be too careful concerning how to divide the 
project, to specify and come to an agreement about what to do and which 
standard we should achieve.”   (Architect)  
The lack of ability to make decisions is often due to lack of competence in the 
client organisation. Additional causes are instability in the organisation and user 
involvement. 
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Instability in the client organisation  
In several projects the client organisation was changed during the process. This 
caused considerable problems. In one project several key persons were exchanged 
at different points in time. The head of the client’s real estate division was 
exchanged after the project had started. A professional construction management 
company was engaged. This company went bankrupt, and another company was 
engaged. In this company the project manager was exchanged after a few months. 
All these changes delayed the project. To accelerate the project process, the client 
therefore decided to divide the project in fifteen separate contracts instead of one. 
After the design was finished, the user organisation was formed. For instance, the 
key person became employed during the production phase. 
Project organisations lose knowledge when key persons leave the organisation. 
The project processes were stopped while the new persons learned the project and 
the established trains of thoughts. The division of responsibility became unclear 
and earlier decisions were changed.  
“We explained that this change in the client’s basic organisation in no 
way will lead to a situation where the organisation comes in and tells us 
that we must do so and so…. ‘Of course, we will not do that!’ Their 
answer was crystal clear. ‘The project is to be performed in accordance 
with the conditions set down in the finished drawings’…. Then you come 
to a reality in which you have a head (of the client organisation) who 
says, ’OK, I respect the things made, but I will change some things 
anyway. Why not do it now? It will be much cheaper to do it now than to 
do it later on.”    (Clients project manager, a consultant)  
User involvement 
Another cause of the lack of ability to make decisions was that the users were 
given great possibilities to give their points of view on the facilities very late 
during production. In a school project, the teachers were employed during the 
production phase. In a refurbishing of a shopping centre, contracts were written 
with several shop owners during production. In two other projects 10 and 30 user 
groups respectively took part in designing the building during production. 
Composition of the design team  
The importance of how to compose teams was obvious. In most projects the 
design was made by groups, whose individuals already knew each other. It 
simplified the co-ordination as well as the co-operation considerably. In project 
teams without earlier relations, the co-operation was considerably worse. In some 
projects only one or two designers were new in the team. The co-operation went 
well due to the fact that their roles were very well established except for the 
communication with the new team member.   
“You must be able to co-operate when you build, but it’s even more 
important that you know each other, that you trust each other when 
designing because it’s a job dealing with abstract components.”   
      (Architect) 
 8 
“The co-operation between us (the designers) has worked out well. We 
have worked together several times before, We know each other quite 
well. It has quite a large importance. It’s easier to contact people you 
already know. You don’t need to worry that they think you want to 
discuss trifles.”     (Structural engineer) 
Composition of the production team 
The importance of composing teams was of great importance also in production. 
In most projects, except the contractors’ own workforce, unemployed workers 
were engaged1. The new workforce was proficient and motivated, but the people 
had not worked together before. In the projects where the teams knew each other, 
the co-operation worked considerably better.  
“…There were people on site who didn’t know each other and who never 
had been working together. They came from different companies with 
different cultures. I believe this is a disadvantage. It’s easier when you 
know each other and have worked together. Then you get the division of 
roles automatically and you know what it means to do what you should 
do.”      (Assistant project manager)  
“To have been working together before has enormous importance 
because then we know how we work and how we suit each other…. It 
may vary a lot how people work, and you are different people.”   
      (Foreman)  
Involvement of the interior designer 
The role of interior designer was found to be indistinct for the decision-makers. In 
several projects it implied that he/she joined the design team very late and 
therefore the co-ordination was disturbed. Already decided solutions had to be 
modified. 
“…I prayed and pleaded that they should hire an interior designer…. that 
they at least should do a program for the interior design. But the project 
management ignored it…. I believe that they don’t understand. They 
considered it as an office building, in which you put pieces of furniture. 
They didn’t realise that there are so many fixtures in this type of building 
(a university including laboratory).”  (Architect) 
“…People believe that the interior designer will just come and hang up 
some curtains and put in some chairs and tables. But interior design 
includes so much more and it’s important that we come in as early as 
possible in the design work. It has to do with the possibilities to arrange 
pieces of furniture in a room and where the doors are and all such 
things…”      (Interior designer) 
                                                
1 In Sweden the contractor normally employs some groups of workers for a long period of time. However, during 
the recession lots of workers became unemployed. As a labour-market measure the government decided that, 
in all public projects, the contractor has to employ a certain number of unemployed workers. 
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Support to the site organisation  
The contractor’s support to the site is important. However, the site organisation 
often found this support insufficient. This was especially clear concerning the 
companies’ improvement programmes. These programmes included for instance 
shortened production time and increased participation of the workers. Both 
examples were meant to be means to increase efficiency, instead they were 
understood as goals. One reason was that the programmes were implemented top-
down. Responsibility was delegated, but the support was insufficient. The site 
organisations were interested, but they could not manage all new activities. The 
workers were introduced late in the programs and many had difficulties in finding 
their new roles.   
“They have ordered us to make these changes. For us it means more 
work. But we haven’t got any support to manage it…” (Site Manager)  
“All of us (workers) are so unused to it…. You are so tightly linked to 
the production. There must be someone (a site manager) who serves you 
with materials and so on all the time.… You can often hear people say 
‘why must we sit here for several hours when we could have been out 
working’?”     (Worker) 
Support to the workers 
The workers often lacked support from their site management. This was especially 
clear concerning the sub-contractors. Their managers often left their workers 
alone on the site, not giving them sufficient information.   
Site managers, who took care of their workers, met them eye-to-eye every day and 
gave firm and clear instructions were most appreciated. However, it seems that 
some minor measures can also influence the motivation.  
“We lack some encouragement…. It’s often enough that they think we 
have done a good job and they buy us a bun…. So you just get the tiniest 
appreciation…”     (Worker) 
A cake or a bun is seen as a symbol of appreciation. 
6  Discussion and conclusions  
The aim of this paper is to discuss causes of defects in construction. The 
discussion is based on an extensive mapping of defects. A complex set of causes 
lies behind the occurrence of defects. When this study was done there was a 
recession in Sweden. The construction industry, especially house building, was 
extremely slow. Several clients had financial problems and were forced to cut 
costs hard. Designers and contractors needed projects to survive and were forced 
to accept projects at low prices. In the hard competition the client also had the 
possibility to demand short construction time. Cost pressure as well as time 
pressure characterised many projects. 
However, it is always individuals who act, and consequently it is always 
individuals who act wrongly. Most defects occur because of lack of motivation, 
especially forgetfulness and carelessness. Other causes are lack of information or 
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knowledge required for the specific task. There are many reasons for this. 
Individuals’ actions are influenced by how the organisation is designed. Many 
causes can therefore be found in organisational aspects. 
Uncertainty in the project organisation is a root cause of many of the defects that 
occurred. Unstable organisations create such uncertainty. Four types of 
organisational instability could be identified. 
1) Gaps in vertical relationships. Two types of lack of communication were found 
between customer and supplier in the project organisation. First, there were often 
unknown customer-supplier relations, which means that the customer and the 
supplier never had met before. Such relationships lack informal routines for 
communication. Second, the suppliers’ support to the customers was often 
lacking. Such gaps were obvious between the client and the designers and 
contractors, between the contractors’ management at the main office and the site, 
and between the site managers and the workmanship. These gaps influenced the 
motivation. 
2) Gaps in horizontal relationships. Lack of communication was also found 
between people in the same team. This was obvious in the design teams as well as 
in the production teams. Teams were composed of people and organisations, 
which had never met before. Such teams lack informal routines for 
communication.  
The third and fourth types of organisational instability cause gaps in horizontal 
relationships. 
3) The organisation is not created in time. Some key actors joined the 
organisation late. The real users were often unknown until the late stages of the 
process. The interior designer often joined the design team late in the design 
process. Both groups’ roles were underestimated. The project organisation needed 
both groups’ knowledge in earlier phases. Decisions already made had to be 
changed, and construction work had to be changed. 
4) The organisation is changed. Key persons surprisingly often left the project 
organisation during the process. This was especially obvious for the client 
organisation. Knowledge necessarily gets lost. This type of organisational 
instability could also be seen when the project organisation carried out several 
projects in sequence. When one actor was exchanged to next project, 
communication problems arose. 
Unstable organisations make the process more complex to control. More defects 
occur, which takes time to correct. Organisational instability was created because 
unknown suppliers offered the lowest prise, people often had to be picked from 
different places, companies went bankrupt and had to be replaced by other 
companies etc. 
All four types of organisational instability have to do with how the project 
organisation is structured. The project manager and the parent companies’ 
managers are responsible for structuring the project organisation. Therefore, it is a 
task for all managers to strive for stable project organisations as a means to reduce 
defects and defect costs. 
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